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LOUISIANA v. KENNEDY
CAROLINE STEVENSON*

I. INTRODUCTION
In 2003, Patrick Kennedy was convicted for the aggravated rape of
his eight-year-old stepdaughter.1 The prosecutor sought the death
penalty, and a unanimous jury sentenced Kennedy to death pursuant
to a Louisiana law authorizing capital punishment for rape of a child
under twelve.2 In response, Kennedy moved for a new trial, arguing
that the Constitution prohibits the death penalty for crimes when the
3
victim survives. Following the denial of that motion, he appealed to
the Louisiana Supreme Court.4 When that court declined to overturn
his death sentence,5 Kennedy petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for
6
review, which the Court granted in January 2008. The Kennedy
decision contains a lengthy examination of the Court’s “cruel and
unusual punishment” jurisprudence, which raises questions about how
the Court can remain persuasive when deciding issues with profound
moral implications.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the morning of March 2, 1998, Kennedy called 9-1-1 and
explained that, while getting his son ready for school, he heard
screaming and, upon investigating, found his stepdaughter on the
ground outside.7 Kennedy claimed she told him that two young, black
males dragged her from the garage to the side yard and that one

* 2009 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. State v. Kennedy (State v. Kennedy), 957 So. 2d 757, 760 (La. 2007).
2. Id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (2008)) The Louisiana Supreme Court noted
that the threshold age was later changed to thirteen, but Kennedy’s trial occurred under the old
version of the law. Id., 957 So. 2d. at 780.
3. Id. at 760.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 793.
6. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 829 (2008) (mem).
7. State v. Kennedy, 957 So. 2d. at 761.
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raped her there.8 His stepdaughter’s injuries, which were described by
an expert in pediatrics as “the most severe he had seen from a sexual
assault,” required emergency surgery.9
Although both the stepdaughter and Kennedy initially reported
the same series of events, other facts emerged that cast doubt on their
accounts.10 For example, Kennedy had called his employer hours
before he called 9-1-1 and explained that he would not be at work
11
that day because “his little girl had become a young lady.”
Furthermore, he had called a carpet cleaning service earlier that
12
morning to remove bloodstains. Kennedy also wiped down the
victim, making it impossible to retrieve a DNA sample,13 and gave
inconsistent statements regarding the bike on which the attackers
14
allegedly rode. Investigators noted that, despite her claims that she
had been dragged across concrete, Kennedy’s stepdaughter had no
scrapes on her legs and there were no signs of struggle in the yard.15
Six years later, Kennedy was tried for his stepdaughter’s rape.
After identifying Kennedy as the rapist, the stepdaughter was unable
to continue her testimony, so the prosecutors introduced a videotaped
interview in which she had identified Kennedy as the rapist.16 After
the video ended, the stepdaughter testified that her previous story
about the two boys was untrue and that Kennedy was the only person
who had raped her.17 The jury ultimately convicted Kennedy of
aggravated rape and voted unanimously for the death penalty.18
On appeal, Kennedy raised a variety of arguments, including
Confrontation Clause challenges to the introduction of the
19
videotape, but his primary argument focused on Louisiana allowing
capital punishment in cases not resulting in homicide because,
according to Kennedy, the U.S. Supreme Court had established “that

8. Id.
9. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2646 (2008).
10. Id. at 2646–47.
11. State v. Kennedy, 957 So. 2d. at 765.
12. Id. at 766.
13. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2646.
14. State v. Kennedy, 957 So. 2d. at 763.
15. Id. at 765, 767.
16. Id. at 768.
17. Id. at 769–71.
18. Id. at 771–72.
19. Id. at 772–79. This issue was not presented to the Supreme Court, but the Supreme
Court of Louisiana found that the introduction of this videotape did not violate the
Confrontation Clause.
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the loss of life is the essential component which renders capital
punishment a proportionate penalty under the Eighth Amendment.”20
Kennedy’s case was subsequently heard by the Louisiana Supreme
Court.
III. THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT AND LEGAL
BACKGROUND
The Eighth Amendment states: “Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
21
punishments inflicted.” The meaning of these terms is far from
certain, but “[o]rdinarily, the terms ‘cruel and unusual’ imply
22
something inhuman and barbarous in the nature of the punishment.”
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Kennedy observed that the meaning
of the Eighth Amendment may change over time23 because it “must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
24
the progress of a maturing society.”
To flush out the requirements of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, the Louisiana Supreme Court examined
25
Gregg v. Georgia. In Gregg, the Court sanctioned the use of the
death penalty after Furman v. Georgia, in which the Court found that
the imposition of the death penalty in the three cases before it would
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.26 The Louisiana court in
Kennedy focused specifically on the Gregg Court’s determination that
the assessment of a punishment’s “excessiveness” requires
determining whether the punishment goes only as far as necessary to
further the legitimate goals of punishment and whether the particular
sentence is disproportionate to the crime.27
The Louisiana court concluded its overview of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence by discussing Roper v. Simmons in which,
when assessing the constitutionality of executing juvenile offenders,

20. Id. at 779.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
22. McDonald v. Commonwealth, 53 N.E. 874, 875 (Mass. 1899) (internal citation omitted).
23. State v. Kennedy, 957 So. 2d. at 779; Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
24. State v. Kennedy, 957 So. 2d. at 779 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101).
25. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
26. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
27. State v. Kennedy, 957 So. 2d. at 779–80 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173).

DO NOT DELETE

1/5/2009 2:21:29 PM

178 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 4:174

the Supreme Court examined both “objective indicia of society’s
standards” and “the Court’s independent judgment.”28
Turning its focus specifically to the Louisiana law challenged by
29
Kennedy, the court noted that it had previously addressed the
constitutionality of the death penalty for child molestation in State v.
Wilson.30 There, the court spent considerable time distinguishing
31
Wilson from the Supreme Court’s decision in Coker v. Georgia.
Coker arose under a Georgia law authorizing the use of the death
penalty for rape.32 Noting that Gregg had left open the
constitutionality of capital punishment for crimes other than
homicide, the Supreme Court in Coker determined that the death
penalty was not a constitutional punishment for the rape of an adult
33
victim. In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized that,
following Furman, no state that had not already permitted capital
punishment added it and that only three of the sixteen states that
permitted capital punishment authorized it for child rape.34 Moving
from the objective indicia to its independent judgment, the Coker
plurality acknowledged the trauma of rape, but differentiated
between rape and murder because “[l]ife is over for the victim of the
murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it
was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair.”35 Based on
this distinction, the Court held that capital punishment was
36
disproportionate to the crime of rape when no life is taken.
The Wilson Court found that the plurality in Coker “took great
pains in referring only to the rape of adult women throughout their
37
opinion, leaving open the question of the rape of a child.” Though
rape of an adult woman is certainly a heinous crime, the Wilson court
interpreted the Louisiana legislature’s passage of the law authorizing
capital punishment for child rapists as signifying that child rape is

28. Id. at 782 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005)) (internal citation
omitted).
29. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42.
30. State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063 (La. 1996).
31. Id. at 1065–66 (La. 1996); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
32. Coker, 433 U.S. at 586.
33. Id. at 592 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 n. 35 (1976) ).
34. Id. at 594–95 (internal citation omitted).
35. Id. at 598.
36. Id.
37. State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1066 (La. 1996).
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significantly worse.38 Moreover, children require “special protection”
by the state due to their vulnerability.39
Having concluded that the Louisiana legislature “determined a
‘standard of decency’” to which deference was due, the Wilson Court
40
then examined other states’ legislation in this area. After
acknowledging that Louisiana was now alone in sentencing child
rapists to death, the court, citing the history from Coker, noted
various state laws permitting capital punishment when the rape victim
is a child41 and found that the more authoritative indicator of the
“evolution” of standards of decency was that these statutes had been
42
enacted after Furman. Moreover, the Wilson Court suggested that
Louisiana’s approach had not been followed by other states because
other jurisdictions were likely postponing their legislation until
constitutional challenges were resolved.43
The Louisiana Supreme Court faced such a challenge in Kennedy.
To determine whether capital punishment was permissible for child
rapists, the court looked to recent U.S. Supreme Court cases regarding
the excessiveness of capital punishment. The Supreme Court had
44
prohibited capital punishment for a variety of non-homicide crimes
and Kennedy argued that Louisiana’s statute would also get struck
down.45 The court noted that the Supreme Court continued to look to
“evolving standards of decency . . . to determine which punishments
46
are so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual.” Furthermore,
the Supreme Court had examined the actions of other legislatures and
47
juries in addition to applying its independent judgment. The

38. Id.
39. Id. at 1067.
40. Id. at 1067–68.
41. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
42. Wilson, 685 So. 2d at 1068.
43. Id. at 1069.
44. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (holding that the imposition of
the death penalty is unconstitutional for the driver of a getaway car who did not commit murder
and who had no intention to do so); Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977) (citing Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) and holding that death for kidnapping and rape was excessive);
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 591 (1968) (holding “the death penalty clause of the
Federal Kidnaping [sic] Act unenforceable” because the death penalty was only available when
the defendant requested a jury trial, thereby creating an unconstitutional disincentive to request
a jury).
45. State v. Kennedy (State v. Kennedy), 957 So. 2d 757, 782 (La. 2007).
46. Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 511, 5661 (2005)).
47. Id. (citing Roper, 453 U.S. at 564 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002)
(holding that the Constitution prohibits the execution of the mentally retarded)).
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Louisiana court noted that, under the first prong of Eighth
Amendment analysis, it should not only assess the current status of
child rape in each of the jurisdictions with capital punishment, but
48
also “take into account the direction of change.” Under the second
prong—the independent judgment prong—the Louisiana court
determined that recent cases indicated that it needed to analyze
“whether capital punishment for a particular class of offenders serves
the twin social purposes of deterrence and retribution.”49
After tracing the development and interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment’s judicially-created, two-part analysis, the Louisiana
Supreme Court applied the test to Kennedy’s case. The court
observed that four states had passed legislation making rape of a child
a capital offense since its decision in Wilson, even though some of the
50
legislation was “more narrowly drawn” or unused. The court also
considered the number of states that have made other non-fatal
51
crimes eligible for the death penalty. Noting the rather surprising
amount of disagreement regarding how various states should be
counted, the court’s complicated count indicated that “approximately
38% of capital jurisdictions (15 of 39, including federal) authorize
some form of non-homicide capital punishment.”52
Though the number of such jurisdictions may not constitute a
clear consensus, the court found that these numbers did signify a
movement towards allowing capital punishment for non-homicide
53
offenses. The court focused primarily on the four other states that
made child rape a crime eligible for the death penalty, but also echoed
the Wilson suggestion that states may simply be unsure of what the
Supreme Court will allow.54
Under the second prong of the Eighth Amendment analysis, the
court contrasted the offenders targeted by the law at issue with the
mentally retarded and juvenile offenders exempted from receiving
capital punishment by Atkins v. Virginia55 and Roper v. Simmons and
held that the “execution of child rapists will serve the goals of

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 783.
Id.
Id. at 784.
Id.
Id. at 788.
Id.
Id. at 788; see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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deterrence and retribution just as well as execution of first-degree
murderers would.”56 The Louisiana court, therefore, upheld Kennedy’s
conviction and death sentence.57 Kennedy then petitioned the U.S.
Supreme Court for certiorari, which the Court granted.
IV. KEY FINDINGS OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
To determine if executing a child rapist is constitutional, the U.S.
Supreme Court first examined its case law regarding the death
penalty when the crime does not lead to homicide. Although the
Court found capital punishment disproportional to the non-homicide
crimes in Coker v. Georgia,58 Enmund v. Florida,59 and Eberheart v.
60
Georgia, the Court reached the contrary result in Tison v. Arizona, in
which the defendants did not personally kill the victims but were
integrally involved in the events leading up to the death.61
Accordingly, the Court concluded that there is no rule barring the use
of capital punishment for crimes that do not result in death and
reaffirmed the two-part test of the “objective indicia of society’s
62
standards” and its “own independent judgment.”
The Court’s search for “objective indicia of society’s standards”
began by examining the state of capital punishment law in 1925, when
a total of twenty jurisdictions, including the federal government,
63
64
allowed capital punishment for rape. Following Furman v. Georgia,
which led to an informal moratorium on capital punishment, six states
reintroduced the death penalty for rape, but all six sentencing
schemes were later struck down for various reasons.65 Although
Louisiana was the first state to again provide for capital punishment
66
for the rape of a child, five other states followed. The Court observed
that the two parties disagreed as to the status of various state laws, but
it concluded that forty-four states and the federal government have

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
(2008).
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

State v. Kennedy, 957 So. 2d. at 788–89.
Id. at 793.
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).
Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977).
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 137 (1977); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2646
Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2650.
Id. at 2651.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2651 (internal citation omitted).
Id.
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not made the rape of a child a capital crime.67 Ultimately, the Court
held that this overwhelming majority was significant.68
The Court then addressed the argument that states have not
enacted statutes similar to Louisiana’s because they misunderstood
69
Coker. Noting that the victim in Coker was only sixteen, the Court in
Kennedy nevertheless held that Coker “does not speak to the
70
constitutionality of the death penalty for child rape.” Moreover, the
Court found no evidence to support the proposition that jurisdictions’
misinterpretation of Coker led to trepidation in making child rape a
capital crime, although the Court did note the existence of contrary
statements in some state court opinions.71
Next, the Court addressed Louisiana’s argument that, although
only a few states have authorized the death penalty for child rape,
these states “reflect a consistent direction of change in support of the
death penalty for child rape.”72 To offset the low number of states with
similar child-rape capital punishment laws, Louisiana attempted to
harness the Supreme Court’s language that “[i]t is not so much the
number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the
73
direction of change.” Though the Court did acknowledge “that in the
last 13 years there has been change towards making child rape a
capital offense,” it determined the trend was not comparable to that in
Atkins v. Virginia, in which the Court held the execution of the
mentally retarded to be unconstitutional after finding a national trend
against it, or Roper v. Simmons, in which the Court prohibited capital
punishment for crimes committed prior to the age of eighteen after
finding a national trend disfavoring it too.74 The Kennedy Court,
instead, found the situation more comparable to that in Enmund
where only eight states had enacted the challenged legislation, which
indicated a consensus against it.75 Moreover, no one had been
executed for child rape since 1964, eight years prior to the Furman

67. Id.
68. Id. at 2653 (emphasis added).
69. Id. In addition to being raised by the Respondent and various amici, this argument
appeared in State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1069 (La. 1996), as well as during oral argument.
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 15–17, 46–47, Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (No. 07-343).
70. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2654.
71. Id. at 2655.
72. Id. at 2656.
73. Id. (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002)).
74. Id. at 2657.
75. Id. (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789, 792 (1982)).
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decision.76 Summing up its study of the objective indicia of society’s
standards, the Court concluded “there is a national consensus against
capital punishment for the crime of child rape.”77
The Court then clarified the “independent judgment” prong of the
Eighth Amendment analysis. In attempting to apply the “evolving
standards of decency” to capital punishment, the Court noted it has
generally moved toward restricting the number of death-eligible
offenses78 and emphasized the distinction, featured prominently in
Coker, between murder and all other non-homicide crimes. It also
expressed concern about the frequent incidence of child rape, which
could result in a significant number of executions under statutes like
Louisiana’s.79
Finally, the Court analyzed the death penalty for child rape in
relation to the retributive and deterrent purposes of punishment.80
Although the Court did not decide whether capital punishment would
deter future child rapes, it did determine that “the incongruity
between the crime of child rape and the harshness of the death
penalty poses risks of overpunishment and counsels against a
constitutional ruling that the death penalty can be expanded to
include this offense.”81 Furthermore, the Court held that the potential
retributive function of capital punishment was less compelling for
82
child rape than for murder.
Additionally, because the capital sentencing process can last years
and require multiple appearances, the Court was concerned about the
83
impact it might have on child victims. The child’s lack of autonomy
was a concern as well: “Society’s desire to inflict the death penalty for
child rape by enlisting the child victim to assist it over the course of
years in asking for capital punishment forces a moral choice on the
child, who is not of mature age to make that choice.”84 The victim’s
youth also raised concerns about the accuracy of the testimony.85
Lastly, the Court also took seriously the research of some of the amici

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 2657 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 2657–58.
Id. at 2659 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 at 187 (1976)).
Id. at 2660 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 at 598 (1977)).
Id.
Id. at 2662.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2662–63.
Id. at 2663.
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indicating that the availability of the death penalty might both lead to
underreporting and increase the likelihood that the rapist would kill
the victim.86 Taken together, these factors led the Court “to conclude,
in [its] independent judgment, that the death penalty is not a
87
proportional punishment for the rape of a child.”
Justice Alito, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas and Chief
Justice Roberts, dissented. He observed that the majority’s holding
forbids imposing the death penalty
no matter how young the child, no matter how many times the
child is raped, no matter how many children the perpetrator rapes,
no matter how sadistic the crime, no matter how much physical or
psychological trauma is inflicted, and no matter how heinous the
88
perpetrator’s prior criminal record may be.

Justice Alito, addressing the majority’s finding of a consensus
against the use of the death penalty to punish child rape, began by
challenging the Court’s assessment of the impact of Coker on state
legislatures.89 While agreeing with the majority that the Coker holding
was limited to the rape of an adult woman, Justice Alito noted that
Justice Powell interpreted Coker’s plurality opinion to cover all rape.90
Justice Alito suggested that states may have declined to authorize the
death penalty for child rape in light of this ambiguity and the costs of
implementing such a sentencing procedure, leading to the low
91
numbers cited by the majority.
The dissent in Kennedy focused on the increased legislative
attention for child rape to argue that the Court had fundamentally
92
misunderstood the direction of society’s evolution. Moreover, while
the majority pointed to the failure of similar legislation in states other
than Louisiana, the suspension of those legislative efforts
corresponded to the Court’s granting of certiorari in Kennedy.93 The

86. Id. at 2664 (citing Brief for National Association of Social Workers et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11–13, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641(2008) (No. 07343)).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 2665 (Alito, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 2666.
90. Id. (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 603 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)).
91. Id. at 2667–68.
92. Id. at 2669 (focusing on sex offender requirements, and the five states that made child
rape a capital crime in spite of Coker).
93. Id. at 2671.
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dissent described the majority’s jurisdiction count as “misleading.”94
As a result, the dissent concluded the “objective indicia” portion of its
analysis by focusing on the six states that had chosen to allow the
death penalty for child rape, arguing that these states might have
served as the beginning of an evolution towards consensus had the
Court not ruled the way it did.95
Turning its attention to the independent judgment portion of the
analysis, the dissent criticized the majority’s concern for the impact on
the victim if forced to participate in the capital sentencing process and
the potential effect the new legislation might have on offenders.96
According to the dissent, such “policy arguments . . . are simply not
pertinent to the question of whether the death penalty is ‘cruel and
unusual’ punishment . . . [because t]he Eighth Amendment protects
the right of an accused.”97 The dissent also noted possible limiting
factors that state legislatures have already used to limit the number of
98
cases where the death penalty was available. Moreover, the Kennedy
majority, as Justice Alito observed, did not hold that death may be
imposed only for crimes where the victim dies because it preserved
the use of capital punishment for crimes such as treason.99
Additionally, the dissent focused on the majority’s concerns about
100
expanding the realm of crimes punishable by death. Because Coker
did not address the question of child rape and because state laws are
presumed to be valid, the dissent argued that affirming Louisiana’s
sentencing scheme would not constitute an expansion of capital
101
punishment. The dissent also rejected the majority’s judgment that
murder’s impact on the victim and society is unique.102 The dissent
devoted considerable attention to the serious impact of child rape on
both individual victims and society and concluded that the Court
failed to justify its decision to strike down Louisiana’s attempt to
respond to these injuries.103

94. Id.
95. Id. at 2671–72.
96. Id.
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. Id. Many of the states with these laws require, for example, that the defendant have a
prior conviction of a sexual offense before the defendant may receive capital punishment. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2675 (quoting id. at 2658).
101. Id. (internal citation omitted).
102. Id. at 2676.
103. Id. at 2676–77.
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V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
Although Kennedy v. Louisiana contains a wide range of possible
arguments to analyze, this Commentary focuses on the mechanics and
implications of the Court’s reliance upon jurisdiction counting to
establish “objective indicia.” The opinions in Kennedy demonstrate
the most basic problem with relying on this tallying method—the
inability to agree upon the categorization of a particular jurisdiction’s
law. Moreover, substantial disagreement existed as to the meaning
behind these numbers. Both the majority and the dissent discussed in
104
detail the impact of Coker v. Georgia on state legislatures. The
Kennedy Court also miscounted a jurisdiction: the federal government
amended the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 2006 to permit
capital punishment for child rape, but this development went
unnoticed by both the majority and the dissent in Kennedy.105
Taken together, these arguments and omissions highlight three
practical pitfalls present in the jurisdiction counting that the Court
has used in Eighth Amendment cases. First, parties often disagree as
to how to count a jurisdiction. Second, parties may suggest that
various concerns, such as related litigation, impact the numbers and,
therefore, make the reliance upon raw data questionable. Third, the
Court sometimes simply miscounts.
These three pitfalls have potentially wide-ranging implication. As
the author of a Washington Post editorial wrote, “The Supreme
Court’s legitimacy depends not only on the substance of its rulings but
also on the quality of its deliberations,” suggesting that deliberations
based upon faulty facts threaten the persuasiveness of the Court.106
Despite supporting the Court’s original ruling, the author argued that
the Court should agree to rehear the case because “this is an
opportunity for the court to show judicial humility. Before the court

104. See supra notes 69–71, 89–95 and accompanying text.
105. Linda Greenhouse, In Court Ruling on Executions, A Factual Flaw, N.Y. TIMES, July 2,
2008, at A1; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, § 552, 119 Stat. 3136,
3264 (2006). Although parties do have the option to petition the Court for a re-examination of
its decision, even one of the attorneys who argued the case for Louisiana stated that the Court
would likely not elect to hear the case again despite the error. Greenhouse, supra, at A1. The
Justice Department has since stated that “government lawyers should have known that
Congress had recently made the rape of a child a capital offense in the military and should have
informed the Supreme Court of that fact while the justices were considering whether death was
a constitutional punishment for the crime.” Id. at A15.
106. Editorial, Supreme Slip-up; A Recent High Court Ruling is Factually Flawed. The
Justices Should Correct It, WASH. POST, July 6, 2008, at B6.
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declares its final view on national opinion about the death penalty, it
should accurately assess the view of the national legislature.”107
The author’s depiction of the Supreme Court is hardly flattering,
and not simply because the piece focused on the Court’s factual
misstep. The suggestion that the Court could benefit from an exercise
in “judicial humility” implies that the Court merely makes
pronouncements upon a captive citizenry. But, of course, that is
precisely the function of the Supreme Court, which has been “vested”
108
with the “judicial power of the United States.” To suggest that the
Court’s image would be bolstered by “humility” is to suggest that
some people resent or question the Court’s authority and that its
public image as final arbiter of law could somehow be improved by
acknowledging that it too makes mistakes.
In addition to flagging the possible impact of such an error on the
Court’s ability to persuade, the editorial’s use of the phrase “its final
109
view of national opinion” raises a more troubling issue. The Court in
Kennedy looked for “objective indicia of consensus” under the first
prong of the Eighth Amendment analysis, but this editorial suggests
that this search for something “objective” may actually be a highly
subjective inquiry.110 The disagreement between the majority and the
dissent about how to characterize certain jurisdictions’ approaches to
the death penalty for child rape may bolster such a conclusion, as
does the lengthy discussion about the potential impact Coker had on
these numbers.111
The inclusion of the second prong of the cruel and unusual
punishment analysis—the independent judgment of the Court—
strongly implies that this inquiry should remain separate from the
“objective” assessment present in the first prong. One might then
wonder if the creation of the second prong stemmed from a desire to
acknowledge publicly what had long been considered privately: the
Justices’ personal feelings regarding the use of capital punishment.
On a practical level, the way the Justices read the results of the
jurisdiction counting and Coker’s potential influence is necessarily
intertwined with their understanding of the constitutionality of the

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
Editorial, supra note 106 (emphasis added).
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2651 (2008).
Id. at 2652; see supra notes 69–71, 89–95 and accompanying text.
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death penalty for child rape. If, for example, a Justice believes that
Coker confused state legislatures as to the legality of capital
punishment for any kind of rape, including the rape of a child, then a
Justice could argue that a state’s attempt to permit capital punishment
for child rape should indicate the state’s strong belief in its necessity
and propriety.112 But the end result would be indistinguishable if a
Justice used the argument that Coker confused state legislatures to
support his pre-existing belief that the death penalty is appropriate
for child rape. As a result, the numbers could inform the conclusion,
or the conclusion could lead to the interpretation of the numbers, but
a Justice could easily conceal the latter in writing an opinion under
the cloak of the “objective indicia.”
The questions then become whether a court can be objective in its
search for evidence of a consensus regarding “the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” and whether
it is desirable for the Court to be objective at all.113 The Court decided
years ago that the meaning of the Eighth Amendment would not be
tied to the time of its drafting, but instead that its meaning would
adjust in response to changing conditions.114 While this flexibility
allows the Eighth Amendment to remain relevant, it poses unique
interpretive issues. In assessing what constitutes “decency,” one must
question if a judge can remove a discussion of morality from the
value-laden term in order to provide the objectivity required by
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. By relying upon an assessment of
the decisions of various legislatures in determining society’s view of
the use of the death penalty in a particular context, the judge can
theoretically add a barrier between personal views and society’s view.
There are serious rhetorical or persuasive advantages in erecting
such a barrier. Professor Austin Sarat made an analogous argument in
suggesting that the movement to abolish the death penalty would be
better served by a focus on the procedural flaws in the
implementation of the death penalty, rather than continuing to

112. See Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2666 (Alito, J., dissenting) (supporting the proposition that
states enacted capital punishment laws for child rape in spite of the dicta in Coker) .
113. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
114. See id. (stating that the meaning of “cruel and unusual” should change over time);
Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349, 374 (1910)) (“Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is
enacted, it is true, from an experience of evils but its general language should not, therefore, be
necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. . . . Therefore a principle, to be
vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is
peculiarly true of constitutions.”).
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challenge the morality of capital punishment.115 According to
Professor Sarat, the argument against the morality of the death
penalty has failed, but a new focus on the constitutional problems
with the mechanics of capital punishment could prove more
convincing.116
In a similar vein, the appeal to these “objective indicia” of how
society views the death penalty may prove more convincing than “a
frontal assault on the morality of state killing” in a particular
117
context. Individual citizens may respond to their jurisdictions’
legislative action on capital punishment with a variety of arguments,
but, in the end, the court would only “count” this objection in the first
part of its Eighth Amendment analysis. But this shift in rhetoric is
only effective if genuine. If the Court loses the ability to call its
assessment of the current state of the law “objective,” the Justices lose
a critical element of persuasion.
The taint of subjectivity may not stem from any subterfuge on the
part of the Court. But because the “objective indicia” element of the
Eighth Amendment analysis could so easily be influenced by personal
judgments, the Court must scrupulously assess each jurisdiction’s
statutes. At the same time, a descent to mere nose-counting would
posit the Justices as pollsters, not judges. The problem with Kennedy,
therefore, may be that a well-reasoned opinion may simply fail to
persuade if the conclusion appears to have come before the
reasoning.

115. AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE KILLS 246–60 (Princeton University Press 2002)
(2001).
116. Id. at 249–51.
117. Id. at 251.

